Sunday, August 28, 2016

Why Judge Visram is a Credible Candidate for CJ


I feel impelled to demur to Wachira Maina’s opinion, “Visram may be front runner in race for CJ post but he has hurdles to jump” published in the Daily Nation of 22nd July, 2016. In the article, my learned senior colleague questions Judge Visram’s suitability for appointment as Chief Justice of Kenya based merely on issues arising from the Judge’s legal partnership and the Judge’s decision in the defamation case involving Nicholas Biwott. I base my demurer on personal experience as an advocate in Visram’s court.
Barely six months after my admission to the bar, I litigated the case of Ronald Muge Cherogony v. the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of Kenya & 2 Others (Nairobi High Court Misc. Cause No. 671 of 1999) before then Commissioner of Assize, Alnasir Visram.  As a newly admitted counsel, the decks were highly stacked against me for at least two reasons. First, courts are extremely deferential to senior counsel and their view on the law is often taken, at least at the perceptional level, to be the correct one. In my case, the Chief of Defence Forces was ably represented by the veritable and highly experienced Lt. Col. Mbewa (now demised), a man versed with the complex nuances of military law- thus the more reason his view could have been controlling.   Second, I was seeking the quashing of the decision of the military authorities to arraign my client, Ronald Cherogony, before a Court Martial for alleged ticketing offences; a rather near impossible undertaking. Pending the Court Martial, my client was remanded in custody. The legal question before the Court was whether the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under article 65(2) of our previous constitution extended to members of the disciplined forces whose rights had been circumscribed by section 86(2) of that same constitution. In other words, the contention was whether the High Court could interfere with proceedings of a Court Martial. After months of argument and interim applications (during which Col. Mbewa eloquently conveyed the tenets of military law and I weighed in with whatever force I could then muster of constitutional law), the learned Judge Visram handed down his ruling on 3rd of May 2000. While finding that no constitutional violation had been occasioned in the matter, the Judge nevertheless proceeded to lay down the legal principle in words that have now become the sine qua non of procedural fairness in military proceedings thus:
Where a statute lays down a particular procedure for the doing of an act, such a procedure may be construed to  be directory or mandatory.  If it is directory, then it is meant to be a guideline and a departure therefrom is not necessarily fatal to the validity of the decision-making process.  However, if it is mandatory then any departure renders the ultimate decision null and void. Where an act affects the rights of a person and that effect is penal in nature statutory conditions and procedure should be scrupulously adhered to.  I am much influenced by s.86(2) of the Constitution which states that ‘In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force raised under any law in force in Kenya, nothing contained or done under the authority of the disciplinary law of that force shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter other than sections 71, 73 and 74.’  Since the applicant cannot rely on, inter alia, s.77 of the Constitution which establishes the right to a fair hearing, it is imperative that whatever procedural safeguards… provided by the Armed Forces Act and rules made thereunder are strictly preserved.  I therefore find the procedures laid down in the Act, Rules and Standing Orders to be mandatory, and departure therefrom [is] fatal.
Applying these principles, the learned Judge found non adherence by the Army with various statutory antecedents to the convening of a Court Martial, including the manner in which the judge advocate of the tribunal was appointed. He proceeded to grant my clients the order of Certiorari sought and ordered for reinstatement of his privileges.  
It is fair to say that Judge Visram’s principles in Cherogony has given forth a progeny of progressive jurisprudence in administrative law cited by many respected judges and jurists alike including by Judge Ojuang, an eminent supreme court judge, in Lt. Col. Benjamin Muema v AG and others.

More importantly, in Cherogony, I was able to vindicate my client’s rights because of the Judge’s even keeled disposition, gentle firmness, and willingness to make his court the true temple where equality of arms is extended to all.

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Retracing the Evolution of KPW



I remember the sweltering heat of Niamey the capital of Niger which played host to  the 33rd ordinary session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights in May 2003 for at least two reasons. First, it is during this session that CEMIRIDE and Minority Rights Group International filed a Petition on behalf of the Endorois community over state annexation of Lake bogoria which 8 years later would yield a landmark decision that would energize the indigenous movement in Kenya and the continent. Second, and relevant to this article, is that I had the opportunity to  meet  Dr. Melakou Tegegne who was then working with Panos in Adis Abeba.In between escaping the unbearable temperatures in Niamey by partaking copious mugs of iced Karkade- the Sahelian beverage made out of hibiscus flowers- we conversed at length on models for advocacy of pastoralist rights.

Ethiopia, according to Melakou, had pioneered a very innovative concept of facilitating constructive dialogue between the state and pastoralists, namely the Ethiopian Pastoralist Day (EPD). An initial concept of the Pastoralist Forum of Ethiopia, EPD had grown into an annual event that was hosted under the auspices of the Ministry of Federal Affairs. It was unsurprising, given the stature of the event, for the chief executive of the country-the Prime Minister- to attend the events of the day. This discussion formed an important conceptual bedrock upon which the Kenya Pastoralists Week (KPW) was initiated.

In designing KPW, there was a clear appreciation that unlike in Ethiopia, in Kenya, state and media response towards pastoralism as a livelihood  was ambivalent at best and hostile at worst. Additionally, Kenya’s highly centralized state which concentrated all vital state functions in the capital, Nairobi, militated against the adoption of the Ethiopian model where the EPD, thanks to the federal character of the state, was hosted in various regions occupied by pastoralist groups on a rotational basis.  The dynamism of Kenya’s political milieu also meant that any advocacy process needed to puncture the popular imagination in ways quite different from the Ethiopian experience, where EPD had gradually become mainstreamed into formal state programming. The need to also ensure that KPW’s approach enabled the envoicing and ownership of pastoralist groups across the country weighed heavily on the program design.

Balancing the foregoing imperatives was a fairly unenviable task. In the end, the KPW was developed as a programme whose philosophy was to provide safe and creative national space for positive profiling of pastoralism. To deliver, KPW needed to grow out of community agency-through supporting the execution of ‘zonal events’- and engage the state at the national level through a week long program of activities.  Such effort aside from the demands of its scale and scope could only be carried forward through a multi-stakeholder approach.  It was conceived that CEMIRIDE would provide the technical and secretariat role but that the program structure would bring together a range of local and national advocacy and state institutions whose competencies would bear on successful implementation. Coordinating the local and national efforts and creating vertical and horizontal links for the panoply of actors with varied interests, messages, methodologies  and capacities was and remains a huge challenge. Yet, it is this cacophony, this untidy knot, that has continued to enrich the programme, sustaining it through the initial years when resource mobilization was a dreary affair to its current less volatile phase.
Through its ten year evolution, KPW has transformed into an important national platform for visible articulation of concerns of pastoralist groups but also an instigator of the elusive pan-pastoralists solidarity in the context of policy advocacy. The program has enabled communities dramatize their social economic predicaments as demonstrated for instance during the ‘great trek campaign’ in 2005 which raised national consciousness by way of an aggressive media campaign that captured the 1 month long trek of community groups tired of the state neglect of the Moyale-Isiolo road as a broad metaphor for the economic exclusion of Northern Kenya. Indeed, communities credit the KPW for the ongoing tarmacking of this important road that links Kenya and Ethiopia-with enormous economic potential. KPW has catalyzed the emergence of institutions, including the League of Pastoralist Women, which started as part of KPW’s attempt to increase pastoralist women voices in governance. In the ebbs and flows of Kenya’s search for a new constitution and its effective implementation, KPW has been a crucial site for enabling active engagement of community groups with such crucial national processes. KPW has not just been about intra-pastoralist conversation. Rather, it has also enabled policy makers and mainstream groups to engage with these communities not as noble savages of a bygone era, but as equal citizens of a diverse democracy. This legitimation for me was most apposite when in the 2006 KPW forum ,children from various primary schools in Nairobi held an art exhibition at KICC where they captured on canvass their innocent views of pastoralism. That this forum was graced by Njeeri Ngugi, the wife of Kenya’s celebrated literary giant, Ngugi wa Thingo, suggests the potential inherent in KPW as a space for a more rigorous cross-cultural conversation on the Kenya we should crave for. The pastoral parades that increased Nairobi’s traffic snarl ups and the penultimate gala night in which pastoral cuisine and couture abound evince an impulse to engage the  ‘other’ without trepidation.

It would be remiss if I were to suggest that KPW has evolved without the sweat and blood of many leaders. In its annals stand tall, men such as the late Eddy Ekuam who was the constant master of ceremonies at gala events;  the late Guracha Konchora, whose pen gave forth the first edition of the Pastoralist Post. Women such as Alyce Kureiya and Josephine Nashipae, too who have borne the pain and joy of carrying forward KPW’s visionand must be saluted. My worthy successor at CEMIRIDE, Yobo Rutin, who is now leading the charge in taking KPW to the Counties, cannot go unmentioned.

Perhaps then, the story of KPW is the story of relationships build, experiences shared and of struggles waged. Its nascent success presents important lessons, not just on policy advocacy but on the need to finally address the challenge of inclusion and belonging in the country. None of us should feel strangers in this commonwealth. Much remains to be done given the perfidious state’s paternalism of pastoralists as needing command and control type of governance in order to bring them peace, health, happiness, and other benefits of civilization . . . But, undoubtedly-and this must change- the extension of government control is directly related to protecting the economic interests of the Nairobi government-which often has little to do with the guys on the margins of our collective geographical space..
Long live KPW!

Friday, August 10, 2012

Sovereignty Argument in the Biometric Voter Equipment Debate is Unrealistic



Korir Sing’Oei, is an international human rights attorney and Litigation Director, Katiba Institute
This article offers an opposite view to that advanced in Jaindi Kisero’s article in the Daily Nation of Wednesday, August 8th. Kisero avers that major sovereignty and national security issues are implicated by the decision to allow a foreign firm identified on government-government contracting to provide biometric kits to facilitate fair elections merely because such a firm will have biometric data of over 18 million Kenyan citizens. I hold divergent views to Kisero based on several grounds.
First, from the experience of 2007-8 elections, violence in Kenya has troubling trans-national implications. Therefore, given the deep economic and social ties that inform our current interactions, credible and peaceful elections in Kenya are not only a legitimate expectation of Kenyans but of the entire region.  Electronic voter registration and votes tabulation has been advanced as one means for minimizing the manipulability of electoral outcomes. Tested in some constituencies in the context of the referendum in 2010, automation of voter registration and tabulation expedited the entire voting and tabulation process contributing to the minimization of disputes arising from perceived malfeasance of electoral officials. The offer by the international community to support the acquisition of a tool for a more efficient and credible election-albeit outside Kenya’s procurement regime- cannot be viewed as threatening national security or sovereignty more than a botched election would do.
Second, the author fails to appreciate that the Westphalian model of state sovereignty has dramatically changed. Whereas this model made states the central interlocutor between global governance institutions and citizens, the entry of powerful non-state actors in contesting for this space has reduced state hegemony. Unsurprisingly, Kisero’s views resonate with proponents of ‘thick sovereignty’ who strenuously argued against the involvement of external mediators to quell the violence in 2007-8 on national sovereignty grounds. To this coterie of conservatives, Kenya would rather have been allowed to burn in a cauldron of self annihilation, if only to ingratiate its deep seated feelings of independence. In contrast, sovereignty within current global politics recognizes that the state is becoming embedded in a broader and deepening transnational arena concerned with the production of public goods. According to John Ruggie, a Harvard professor of international relations and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Business, this shared sovereignty represents the new realism where sovereignty inheres not just in states but in people, namely citizens of these states. Appreciating this reality, our new constitution articulates peoples’ sovereignty in fairly unambiguous terms in article 1, thus “All sovereign power belongs to the people of Kenya.”
Third, international and regional regulation of electoral and democratic processes caution against looking at elections from an insular perspective. The AU, itself a less than liberal institution, taking a fairly pragmatic approach has legislated on the issue of elections through the adoption of the AU Charter on Democracy Elections and Good Governance. This treaty, which Kenya has signed, commits states parties to promote the “utilisation of information and communication technologies” in securing credible election outcomes. The import of ratifying such a treaty is to make Kenya amenable to regional and international supervision in relation to the conduct of its affairs relative to elections, thereby technically constraining the notion of sovereignty.
It therefore follows that credible and peaceful elections in Kenya are no longer an independent but an interdependent choice where the ‘public’ to be engaged is not merely the Kenyan public, even if Kenyan citizenry are implicitly the primary actor in this drama. To be apprehensive about this ‘external public’ is to shirk our responsibility to embrace a broader notion of peoples’ sovereignty.

Monday, May 28, 2012

Indigenous World, 2012: Kenya


http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0573_THE_INDIGENOUS_ORLD-2012_eb.pdf

Review of Inter American System's Jurisprudence on Indigenous Peoples Rights


A SCHEMATIC APPRAISAL OF JURISPRUDENCE OF INTER AMERICAN COURT ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’  RIGHTS
CASE
FACTS
JUDGEMENT
ANALYSIS OF DECISION
COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE & INTL INSTR. CITED
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua
(Judgment of 31.8. 2001)
Awas Tingni is indigenous to Nicaragua’s Atlantic coastal region. The community held its ancestral territory for hundreds of years as collectivity. In 1995 the Awas Tingni learned of the Nicaragua government’s plan to grant a logging license to Korean lumber company SOLCARSA on more than 62,000 hectares of the community’s homeland. Although the Nicaragua Constitution concedes “equal protection” under law for indigenous communities, the government claimed that the Awas Tingni had neither legal title nor ancestral right to the land in question.
Right to judicial protection (art. 25 read together with art. 1(1) and 2); right to property (art.21) violated. IACtHR refused to find violation of right to life (4), privacy (11), conscience and religion (12), association (16), family (17), movement and residency (22) and right to participate in govt. (23). IACtHR ordered for delimitation demarcation and titling of Awas Tingni territory, legal reform, reparation (US$ 50,000), Costs (US$ 30,000)
-IACtHR uses “an evolutionary interpretation of international instruments for the protection of human rights, and takes into account norms of interpretation including article 29(b) of the Convention -which precludes a restrictive interpretation of rights to find that article 21 of the Convention protects the right to property “in a sense which includes, among others, the rights of members of the indigenous communities within the framework of communal property” (¶ 148).

-Court defines property as “those material things which can be possessed, as well as any right which may be part of a person’s patrimony; that concept includes all movables and immovable, corporeal and incorporeal elements and any other intangible object capable of having value” (¶ 144).

-Court recognizes that property notions founded on individual ownership must be adjusted to accommodate the unique property forms espoused by indigenous people, which includes collective ownership, right to freely live in their territory-these being justified because the “ close ties of indigenous people with the land [being] the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity” ( ¶ 149).

- Court considers customary law of the community and proposes that “possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title to property of the land to obtain official recognition of that property and for consequent registration”. (¶ 151).

-Court also looks at trevaux preperetoires of the American Convention on Human Rights to determine the meaning of property in article 21. See concurring judgement of Sergio Garcia Ramirez J: “The language in which this right (property) is framed was meant to accommodate all subjects protected by the Convention. Obviously, there is no single model for the use and enjoyment of property”. (¶ 11).

-Court proposes that terms used in international human rights standards have autonomous meaning beyond those ascribed to them by national legislation. It looks at ILO Convention 169
ICJ/PCIJ
1. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (1949)
2. Factory at Chorzow (1928) [both for the proposition that obligation to provide adequate reparation for violations is a principle of international law.]

European CtHR

Kenmache v France (Jd of November 2,1993)

International Instruments and standards
ILO Convention 169 art. 14(1)
UN Draft Declaration on Indigenous Peoples (then)
Geneva Convention on Law of Treaties (art 31(1))
Moiwana v Suriname ( Judgement of June 15, 2005)
On November 29, 1986, Suriname army attacked the N’djuka Maroon village of Moiwana and massacred over 40 men, women and children, and razed the village to the ground. Those who escaped the attack fled into the surrounding forest, and then into exile or internal displacement. On November 12, 1987, almost a year later Suriname simultaneously ratified the American Convention on Human Rights and recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Almost ten years later, on June 27, 1997, a petition was filed with the IACmHR and later on lodged with the IACtHR.
Court found violation of right to judicial protection in article 25, right to property in article 21, freedom of movement in article 22, right to fair trial in article 8 -all read within the penumbra of obligations set out in articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention. IACtHR ordered for adoption of legislation to give effect to Moiwana property rights; establishment of community development fund for US$ 1,200,000 being compensation; awarded US$ 45,000 as costs
-The Court asserted jurisdiction by holding that Suriname’s failure “to investigate . . . starting from the date when Suriname recognized the Tribunal’s competence”  formed the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction
-Failure to investigate and punish massacre against an indigenous/tribal group will constitute a “continuing violation” for the purposes of determining the culpability of a state, even if the act complained against took place before the state had ratified a given treaty.

-Court infers that if a tribal or indigenous/tribal community cannot access its ancestral land by virtue of failure on part of state to visit just deserts upon perpetrators of a massacre, right to property of such community will have been violated. This is notwithstanding the fact that such a community may not have legally recognised title to the land and their claim is only anchored upon possession and historical occupation. (¶ 131).

-Ct found that an indigenous community’s claim to ancestral land was not defeated merely by the fact that they were no longer in possession, if it can be shown that they lost possession and continue so to do, through the instrumentality of state violence (¶ 134).

-Court declined to find that right to life in article 4 had been breached since the specific events, as opposed to their effects, which gave rise to lose of life, took place before the ratification of the Convention by Suriname, and its interrogation of these events fell outside the Court’s competence. (¶ 92).
Human Rights Committee
Communication 859/1999
Yakye Axa v. Paraguay (Judgement of June 17,2005)
The Yakye Axa community consists of indigenous people that historically engaged in hunting and gathering. Their ancestral land had been sold to foreign investors at the London stock exchange in the early 1900s and members of the community became labourers in the subsequent ranches and farms established. The community sought to return to their ancestral land in 1993 but were denied entry. In defiance of authority, they then set up a settlement by the roadside. Their state of destitution also created an environment of nutritional, medical, and sanitary vulnerability. While Paraguayan constitution and law recognizes indigenous rights, it was incapable of securing the rights sought by the Yakye Axa peoples.

Paraguay was held to have breached Articles 4 (Right to Life), 8 (Right to a Fair Trial), 21 (Right to Property), and 25 (Right to Judicial Protection). Ct. ordered for restitution of land, and demarcation, titling and transfer thereof in favour of Yakye Axa; Legal and administrative changes to secure property rights of community; establishment of community fund of US$ 950,000; Costs of US$ 15,000.
-IACtHR found that the right to judicial protection in articles 8 and 25 in combination with state obligation in articles 1(1) and 2 require that for a judicial recourse availed to claimants to be effective, formal recognition in the constitution or statute was not sufficient. Effectiveness of recourse will be a function of the appropriateness and capability of an established mechanism to secure remedy for a violation. (¶ 61). For indigenous people, Ct. established the need for legal protection that accords with the specificities of the economic, social and cultural context as well as their vulnerability and customary norms (¶ 63).

-In determining the existence of an effective procedure for indigenous land claim court will: i. examine formal existence of recourse mechanisms; ii. Examine the effectiveness of these mechanisms, which involves examining a. weighing the time taken to respond to the issue against the complexity thereof, b. procedural requirements to be met by the Claimant, and c. conduct of judicial authorities. (¶ 65). The net effect of this examination is to establish the existence of procedures that can provide real opportunity for the resolution of an indigenous peoples land claim (¶ 102).

-Legal recognition of the political leadership of an indigenous group for purposes of acquiring property or other rights is a mere formality the non procurement of which does not defeat their inherent claim. (¶¶ 82-84).

-The principle of rational use of property by third party cannot be used to trump an indigenous community’s historical claim, unless it can be shown that the state has done all within its facility to secure the interests of the indigenous vulnerable group. (¶ 97).

-Ct. took as its starting point its decision in Awas Tingni v Nicaragua to interpret article 21 as encompassing collective ancestral land rights of indigenous communities ¶ 124) on the basis of cultural and spiritual connectedness of indigenous people with their ancestral territory. It assessed the scope of property rights by looking at the Convention as a live instrument the interpretation of which must take into account the changing contexts (¶ 125). It also interpreted the Convention on basis of article 31 of Vienna Law of Treaties and Article 29 (b) of the Convention itself (¶¶ 126 & 129).

-The limitation of property rights in article 21(1) is permissible on the grounds of proportionality, namely, if the restriction is closely adjusted to the attainment of legitimate objective, interfering as little as possible with the exercise of the restricted right (¶ 145). The restriction must also not defeat the collective aspirations of the Convention (¶ 145).

- To comply with the article 21(1), State must show that it has assessed clash between ancestral property rights and private property rights and the proportionate impacts of permitting one to prevail over the other considered. The importance of indigenous land rights to their very survival as a cultural group should be taken into account in this balancing process (¶ 146). Ct. established that indigenous land rights will not always trump private property rights under this matrix, since states may have legitimate and justifiable reasons for sustaining private property rights over indigenous land rights (¶ 149).

-Alternatives to restitution of ancestral land to indigenous people must be pursued in consultation and with consent of indigenous group taking into consideration their institutions, values, customs and laws (¶ 151).  

-Failure to guarantee collective property rights to an indigenous community violates right to life of the community to the extent that access to traditional means of subsistence as well as use and enjoyment of natural resources are constrained (¶ ¶167 & 168).

-Court declines to find violation of right to life with respect to the death of 16 members of the community on the grounds of lack of causal connection (¶¶ 177 & 178).

-In finding that state is obliged to delimit and demarcate ancestral land of the Yakye Axa, Ct. stated that it was also upon the state to define the scope of such a territory: “…it is the state’s duty to identify the community’s territory and subsequently, delimit, demarcate, title and transfer the lands, inasmuch as it is the state that has the technical and scientific means to carry out these tasks” (¶ 23 of Yakye Axa v Paraguay Interpretation Judgement of February 6, 2006). Such identification of territory must factor in the historical memory of indigenous group with respect to the territorial scope.

-In dismissing state contention that restitution of ancestral land to the Sawhoyamaxa would prejudice investment treaty between Germany and Paraguay, the court was explicit that “the enforcement of bilateral commercial treaties…should always be compatible with the American Convention, which is a multilateral treaty on human rights that stands on its own…and does not depend entirely on reciprocity among states” (¶ 140).



ECtHR
Tyrer v United Kingdom, 5856/72 Judgment of April 25,1978

International human rights instruments and  Standards
-ILO Convention 169
-UN Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
-UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 14.
Yatama v Nicaragua
(Judgement of  June 23, 2005)
Pursuant to a new law in Nicaragua which required only political parties to participate in the electoral process, YATAMA, a regional political party was excluded from participating in the 2000 Mayoral elections for not meeting the threshold conditions of fielding candidates in 80% of the electoral areas in the RAAN & RAAS regions; a decision of the supreme electoral body that was not subject to judicial review. This was notwithstanding an accommodative provision in the Nicaraguan law that for indigenous organizations, their own natural form of organization and participation will be respected so that they may form regional parties [¶ 124(21)]. This resulted in non- participation of indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast in the political processes and a four year exclusion from decision making process, hence increasing the vulnerability of indigenous communities in the regions.
Right to fair hearing in article 8, right to judicial remedies in article 25, article 23 on political participation of citizens and article 24 on equality before the law, read together with the obligations in article 1(1) and 2 of the Convention had been violated. Ct. awarded US$ 80,000 damages to YATAMA and another US$ 15,000 in costs. It also ordered the state to undertake legal reform, make public apology and publish the operative part of the decision.
-In indicting the decision of the Supreme Electoral Council to exclude Yatama from the 2000 elections, Ct. held that under article 8(1) of the Covenant, decisions of administrative bodies that may implicate human rights, such as the right to political participation, should be amenable to due process, otherwise they would be arbitrary ( ¶ 152).

- Ct. held explicitly that lack of judicial review of decision of an electoral body would offend article 25 of the Convention: “Irrespective of the regulations that each state establishes for its Supreme Electoral Body, the latter must be subject to some form of jurisdictional control that allows it to be determined whether its acts have been adopted respecting minimum guarantees and rights established by the American Convention, and those established in its own laws…” (¶ 175).

-Ct. held that while the regulation of political participation is permissible, under article 23 and 24, it must respect the principle of legality, necessity and proportionality in a democratic society: “Legality requires that state to define precisely by law, the requirement for voters to be able to take part in an election and stipulate clearly the electoral procedures prior to the elections…The restriction should be established by law, non- discriminatory, based on reasonable criteria, respond to a useful and opportune purpose… necessary to an urgent public interest, and be proportionate to this purpose.” The least restrictive option should be pursued (¶ 206).

-Ct confirmed that a statute that required the signatures of 3% of voters before one is deemed qualified to contest an election was an impermissible intrusion on the right to political participation (¶ 213).

-Ct found that any requirement for political participation that would render groups with different form of political organization unable to participate offends article 23 and 24 to the extent that it limits the enjoyment of political rights more than is strictly necessary and is an impediment to political participation (¶ 220).

- The Ct. established that the requirement that all political parties present candidates in at least 80% of the municipalities is a disproportionate restriction that unduly limited the political participation of the candidates postulated by YATAMA for the municipal elections of November 2000: “It does not take into account that the indigenous and ethnic population is a minority, nor that there would be municipalities in which there would be no support for candidates, or that there would be no interest to seek this support”(¶223).
-In its analysis, the Court understood that the obligation of the State to guarantee political rights implied that regulations for its exercise and application be carried out according to the principles of equality and non-discrimination. In the case of people who belong to indigenous or ethnic communities, the regulation must also take into account specifications such as their languages, customs and forms of organization, which may be different from the majority of the population (¶¶ 218 & 219).

- Thus, the Court held that Nicaragua is obligated to “adopt all the necessary measures to guarantee that members of indigenous and ethnic communities of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua can participate, under conditions of equality, in the development policies that influence, or could influence, their rights and the development of their communities.”(¶ 225).

-Ct. held that the denial of YATAMA to participate in the 2000 elections, foreclosed the participation of indigenous peoples in decision affecting them and diluted the democratic credentials of the entire electoral process, impacting negatively on the development of a multicultural state that respects diversity (¶¶  225,226 & 227)


The decision extensively relied on comparative jurisprudence from the ECtHR, and Human Rights Committee. It also analyses and applies various legal standards emerging from treaty bodies etc. See e.g. footnote to ¶ 184 and 192.
Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay
The Sawhoyamaxa lost their land in 19th century when it was sold at London Stock Exchange to repay sovereign dates owing to Paraguay after the War of the Triple Alliance. The new owners employed the indigenous group as casual labourers and restricted their access to traditional lands, thus bringing about significant changes in its subsistence activities. They increasingly depended on their salary for food and took advantage of their temporary stay in the various estates settled in the area to continue developing their subsistence activities (hunting, fishing, and gathering). Even with a new legal framework that envisages restitution of land to indigenous groups, the Sawhoyamaxa’s claim had not been processed by the state 11 years after commencing the procedural requirements. This has barred the Community and its members from title to and possession of their lands, and has kept the community in a state of nutritional, medical and health vulnerability, which constantly threatens their survival and integrity and had resulted in several deaths.


IACtHR ruled in favour of Sawhoyamaxa community and found violation of articles 3 (juridical personality); 4 (right to life); 8 (fair hearing) ; 25 (effective remedy) ,and  21 (property)
-The Ct. established that the lack of legal framework to support compulsory acquisition of land under rational use by third parties and ensure its restitution to indigenous community renders the provision of the Paraguayan Constitution and Agrarian Legislation which provide possibility for land claims by indigenous peoples in the country incapable of satisfying the requirements of articles 8 and 25 of the Convention (¶¶ 102-108). Congressional economic justifications for rejecting request to condemn land and transfer it to an indigenous group, likewise fails to satisfy articles 8 and 25 (¶ 105).

-Ct made it clear that the foundation for collective property in favour of indigenous people is based on its aspiration not to discriminate between two systems of property ownership. The court observed that “This notion of ownership and possession of land does not necessarily conform to the classical concept of property, but deserves equal protection under article 21 of the American Convention. Disregard for this specific  version of use and enjoyment of property, springing from the culture, uses, customs and beliefs of each people, would be tantamount to holding that there is only one way of using and disposing of property, which in turn would render the protection under article 21 …illusory for millions of persons” (¶ 120).

-Ct. reaffirmed the principles established in Awas Tingi v Nicaragua  and set out substantive norms on the nature and scope of indigenous land rights thus: 1) their traditional possession of lands is equivalent  to fee simple property/free hold title; 2) their traditional possession gives rise to a legitimate demand for official recognition and registration of property title; 3) forced displacement of indigenous people from ancestral territory does not divest them of title to their property even though they lack legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith, in which event; 4) they are entitled to restitution thereof or to obtain other lands of equal extension and quality. (¶ 128).

-Indigenous community’s right to restitution of ancestral land from which they were displaced will subsist as long as their cultural connection to the land survives. The court found that such close relationship with ancestral land is “ expressed in different ways, depending on the particular indigenous people involved and the specific circumstances surrounding it, and it may include the traditional use or presence, be it through spiritual or ceremonial ties; settlements or sporadic cultivation; seasonal or nomadic gathering, hunting and fishing; the use of natural resources associated with their customs and any other element characterizing their culture” (¶ 131). The rights of indigenous people whom the state prevents from manifesting their cultural connectedness to a given ancestral land through repression or violence will not lapse (¶ 132).

-In finding violation of article 4 on right to life and holding the state culpable for the deaths of 18 minors, members of the Sawhoyamaxa, the court restated its basis thus: “ In order for this positive obligation to arise, it must be determined that at the time of the  occurrence of the events, the authorities knew or should have known about the existence of a situation posing an  immediate and certain risk to the life of an individual or of a  group of individuals, and that the necessary measures were not adopted within the scope of their authority which could be reasonably expected to prevent or avoid such a risk” (¶ 155). The court adopting this to the vulnerable situation of the community, opined that “those measures which the state undertook to adopt before the members of the Sawhoyamaxa community were different, in view of the urgent nature, from those the state should adopt to guarantee the rights of the population…in general” (¶ 173).

ECtHR
Kilic v Turkey (2000) III, EurCourtHR,63
Oneryldiz v Turkey, Application No. 48939/99, EurCourtHR (gc), Judgement of November 30, 2004
Osman v United Kingdom (1998) VIII, 116

International Instruments and standards
ILO Convention 169
UN Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Saramaka v Suriname
(Judgement of November 28, 2007).
The Saramaka are a tribal community descending from slaves who after freeing themselves were recognized as an autonomous group by treaty with the Dutch colonial authorities in 1762. Since the 16th Century, the community has collectively occupied the Upper Suriname River lands where they practise hunting and gathering, fishing and traditional agriculture (¶¶ 80-84). A Chinese logging company was granted concessions to log in the territory traditionally occupied by the Saramaka without their prior informed consent nor compensation.  Gold mining concessions were equally issued by the state of Suriname. Both development activities had serious impact on the cultural intergrity and environment and therefore threaten the very survival of the community. The Government of Suriname argued that the Saramaka as a collectivity lacked standing before the court. It submitted that its grant of logging and mining concessions were part and parcel of its sovereign rights and were carried out in accordance with domestic law. It contended that the Saramaka were licensees in the land in dispute with respect to which, the state had ultimate title. In particular, it alleged that the community has no right with respect to sub- surface natural resources, including timber and minerals, over which the state sovereign rights permitted its unfettered exploitation in the public interest and according to law. It further pleaded that legislation singling out protection of the Saramaka community’s alleged ancestral land would be discriminatory. In the circumstance, it was not in violation of any of the provisions of the Convention
The State was found to be in violation of the right to property, as recognized in Article 21, the right to juridical personality in article 3 and the right to judicial protection under article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights in relation to the obligations to respect, ensure, and to give domestic legal effect to said rights, in accordance with Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof. The State was ordered to delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title over the territory of the members of the Saramaka people, in accordance with their customary laws and in consultation with the community.

The State was ordered to grant the members of the Saramaka people legal recognition of the collective juridical capacity, pertaining to the community to which they belong, with the purpose of ensuring the full exercise and enjoyment of their right to communal property, as well as collective access to justice, in accordance with their communal system, customary laws, and traditions. Damages of US$ 675,000 to be managed by an Implementing Committee of 3 persons and applied towards community development awarded. Costs of US$ 85,000 payable to the 2 Representatives of the Victims-Forest Peoples Programme and Association of Saramaka Authorities also awarded.





-With respect to the right to property, the court affirmed that scope of indigenous and tribal peoples land rights should be established by an assessment of the customary norms of the community and on the basis of consultation with them (¶¶ 100 & 101). In this respect, a statute that merely grants an interest (as apposed to a right) to the indigenous community in relation to their land,  subjecting their enjoyment to public good, will not satisfy the obligation of a state under article 2 of the Convention (¶¶ 108-110) . A statute that compensated only title holders to land the subject matter of mining and leaves non-title holders (the Saramaka) without recourse would also fail to satisfy article 2 of the Convention (¶111).

-The court interpreted the proviso to article 21 of the Convention as capable of permitting a restriction in the enjoyment and use of land and natural resources within the territory of an indigenous or tribal group. Such restriction must be established by a law of general application and should be necessary, proportional and aimed at achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society (¶ 127).

-The court explicitly held that restriction of property rights will not be permitted if it has the effect of threatening the survival and existence of a tribal or indigenous community and its culture (¶ 128 -To ensure that  the exploitation of natural resources did not threaten the survival of indigenous and tribal group, the court obliges state parties to the Convention to: i) ensure effective participation of the community in conformity with their customs and traditions in any development process; ii) secure their benefit sharing in the outcomes of the development program, and; iii) undertake prior legitimate and comprehensive environmental and social impact assessment of the proposed development intervention (¶ 129)
-The court also established that in order to achieve the participation of indigenous or tribal people in small scale logging/mining development, state parties must secure the free, prior, informed and culturally-compliant consultation of indigenous people (¶ 133). However, with respect to large scale logging/mining programs, state obligation goes beyond consultation and enlarges into prior, informed consent (¶¶ 134-137 (referencing CERD General Comment no. 23 and Special Rapporteur’s report).In this, the court was emphatic:

“…the safeguard of effective participation that is necessary when dealing with major development or investment plans that may have a profound impact on the property rights of the members of the Saramaka people to a large part of their territory must be understood to additionally require the free, prior and informed consent of the Saramakas, in accordance with their traditions and customs.”

Whether a development is small scale or large scale is an issue of fact based on its impact on indigenous peoples’ culture and livelihood.
South Africa
Alexkor Ltd. & Government of South Africa v Richtersveld Community and Others, CCT/1903 (October 14, 2003).

Canada
Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R 1010 (December 11,1997)

African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights
The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre & the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria, Communication 155/96 (2001)

European Court for Human Rights
Connors v United Kingdom Application No. 66746/01 (Judgement of July 15,2002)


Human Rights Committee
Lansman v Finland, Communication 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1994 [Decision of November 8, 1994]).
Apirana Nahuika et al. v New Zealand,  Communication No. 547/1993,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (2000).

International instruments and standards
- Universal Declaration on Human Rights
-International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
-International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
 ILO Convention 169
 -World Bank Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples,
-UNHRC General Comment 23
-UN CERD General Recommendation No. 23. -UN Declaration on Indigenous Rights.



Sunday, July 24, 2011

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DONOR APPROACHES TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICA: PRIORITIZATION, SEQUENCING AND SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGES


Although donor assistance to promote Rule of Law (ROL) in Africa is a small fraction of that enjoyed by others regions, mainly Eastern Europe, it has witnessed exponential growth over the last fifteen years.[1] Both judicial reforms and democratization have been the most important strands of ROL efforts in Africa,[2] focused on “increasing effectiveness of institutions, especially their physical infrastructure, supporting legal and judicial training, [and] making legal information accessible…”[3]
In the main, the democratization   attempt has registered mixed results. Generally, the democratization movement has been criticized on the basis that “when weak states embrace liberal democracy without the corresponding rule of law culture, the result is the emergence of an illiberal regime”.[4] As the one perceived bedrock to democratization, judicial independence has understandably been held aloft.
It is crucial to emphasize that judicial reforms in Africa, which as we have indicated has formed the largest plank of ROL interventions,[5] have been focused on behavioural rather than structural independence of judiciaries.[6] Transforming judiciaries by addressing their capacity as opposed to structural constraints may be unsustainable. Moreover, the choice of judicial reforms is informed by the mistaken belief that courts are the “essence of rule of law system in the country”.[7] This erroneous identification of the locus of the rule of law renders problematic many initiatives as we demonstrate here. Interestingly, the first conference on judicial reforms in Africa at the turn of independence, which brought together judges as well as lawyers across the continent, emphasized that:
Equal access to law for the rich and poor alike is essential to the maintenance of the rule of law…It is therefore essential to provide adequate legal advise and representation to all those threatened as to their life, liberty, property…who are not able to pay for it.[8]

This understanding does seem to reveal that amongst African jurists of the time, while judicial independence was considered important, there was a general feeling that the law needed to respond more to the needs of the society, hence the emphasis on access to justice. The overall perspective at this inaugural conference was that the law needed to maintain a measure of legitimacy and relevance for it to commend respect not just by judicial officers, but by all.[9]
Access to justice for the poor however never rose to occupy a significant place in the emerging architecture of Technical Corporation in Africa.[10] Instead, we witness a sustained focus on reinforcing judiciaries, which, without a concomitantly supportive constitutional framework and progressive civil society would fall prey to corruption and avarice within a short time.[11] In the ensuing delegitimizing of law, it became easy for political barons to begin to manipulate judicial power, without attracting the reprehension of the people, due to the fact that the law as represented by judicial institutions was deemed exclusivist and non responsive to issues most germane to the peoples’ struggles.
Propping up judiciaries that are generally considered illegitimate is not the most sustainable way of deepening the rule of law. For some reason, this discordance has not been addressed by ROL interveners and remains salient in most of sub-Saharan Africa. Three cases illustrate the impact caused on judiciaries by unresolved political questions in African states.
First, Mugabe’s annexation of land from white farmers in Zimbabwe was largely informed by the fact that while the judiciary was fairly independent, the social fabric in the country was extremely weak and vulnerable so that when the political need arose, it was easier to trump presumed illegitimate property rights in the statute books and brings down the judiciary as well. Berry argues:
The courts [interpreted this] as a battle over ‘the rule of law’, but the crisis quickly expanded to a debate over…the legitimacy of inherited laws and institutions…Zimbabwe activists and intellectuals responded that the distribution of property rights was an artefact of colonial rule.[12]
While abhorring the manipulation of property relations in Zimbabwe by Mugabe and his subsequent and systematic undermining of the judiciary,[13] these authors observe that an iniquitous property system grandfathered through the agency of the rule of law, has brought much disrepute to the legitimacy of the law itself in this country.
Second, between 1970 and 1985, the nationalization of property in Tanzania was carried out inspite of constitutional quarantees relating to property.[14] This clearly revealed that in so far as the legal milieu relating to property protected only a few people, the rest of the populace could allow the dismemberment of law and weakening of the judiciary with it, without significant political cost to the elite.
Third, the 1992 Kenya multi party elections outcome was grounded in violent strategies of maintaining power. In this regard, politicians manipulated long-standing, but latent, inter-ethnic disputes over land, inciting communal violence and leading to the displacement of 300,000 people.[15] The 2008 violence was just a re-enactment of the same theme with more dire consequences.[16] The Kenyan judiciary, which for years has shied away from confronting historical land injustices, could offer no viable mechanism for mediating these disputes.[17] Consequently, political arm of government has resorted to ineffective mechanisms to seek temporary reprieve.[18]
Overall, the key assumption of most ROL interveners is that because the legal system in Africa “remains captive to the powers that be…”[19] then core effort ought to focus on extricating institutions, especially the judiciary from such overriding control. While such attempts do generate positive results, the incentive to apply the law in favour of those interests remains, specifically, when the law is vague and leaves much discretion in the hands of judicial authorities. Thus, when the law dealing with an issue such as land remains undeveloped, it is likely that judicial decisions will favour mainstream conceptions of property to the detriment of the poor and under-voiced.
While this paper acknowledges that over the past decade, most countries have been engaged – at various levels of detail – in evaluating their land policies and laws, especially regarding the relative status of customary and statutory tenure,[20] few, if any, of these policies have been framed as rule of law interventions. Even where rule of law reform relative to property rights was pursued, it had narrow commercial goals.[21]
As alluded to earlier in this paper, the nature and distribution of property rights in much of Africa’s post colonial state has been problematic for judicial intervention in two ways. First, much of land in rural Africa is not protected by statutory law but rather by tribal customs. This paper’s concern is that the indeterminacy of property rights in land held through custom allows for the predominance of arbitrariness and abuse of discretion to the detriment of the poor, whom the judiciary is often unable to defend. Second, the most productive rural and urban lands, although protected as freehold or leasehold property are contested since they were imbued with property rights, through colonial annexation of territory prior to the emergence of ‘popular’ rule of law, and are considered illegitimate by the citizens.[22] This form of property attracts judicial intervention, and unfortunately judges, who must look to the letter of the law the foundations of which are faulty, are thus perceived as protectors of unwarranted or unjust wealth
 By failing to speak directly to issues of historical wrongs in the context of land reforms in Africa therefore, ROL interveners have missed an opportunity to consolidate rule of law efforts beyond focusing on the judiciary. This may partly be due to the inflexibility of rule of law grant making who set key priorities, as Carothers observes:
Donors sometimes determine rule of law reform priorities. Enormous amounts of aid are granted for the writing or re-writing of laws, especially commercial laws.[23]
With such donor-driven priority setting, it is small wonder that rule of law efforts in Africa have been stymied.
To be fair, the last ten years has also witnessed an emerging shift in rule of law programming, though the sustainability and consistency of it cannot be assessed. For instance, the overall emphasis on human rights as an important constituent of ROL, means that the poor, including those who has historical land claims and those whose land rights are insecure due to being managed under customary tenure, have found a voice.
            Donor strategies are also taking on more comprehensive approaches. For instance, multiple donors have assisted countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Malawi to adopt a sectoral approach to ROL, which departs from single institution reform approach and instead targets an entire sector such as constitutional reform, corruption, police reforms and infrastructural development.[24] President Bush’s Millennium Challenge Account as a new model to “support governments that commit to rule justly, invest in people, and encourage economic freedom,”[25] must also be seen in the light of this donor shift. Of MCC’s 18 grants, also known as Millennium Challenge Compacts, 11 are with African countries, totalling nearly $4.5 billion or nearly three fourths of the total value of all MCC Compacts signed to date.[26]






[1] It has been estimated that donor assistance for ROL programming in Africa rose from US $ 17.7 million in 1994 to over $ 110 million. See e.g., Laure Helene Piron, Donor Assistance To Justice Sector Reform In Africa: Living Up To The New Agenda in human rights and justice sector reforms in africa: contemporary issues and responses, 4 (2005, Open Society Institute) available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/osji/articles_publications/publications/justice_20050207> . In contrast, USAID alone spent $ 202 million in Eastern and Central Europe’s rule of law programs in 2004. See e.g.,USAID Central and Eastern Europe Regional Data Sheet at  http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/ee/cee_reg/180-022.html>.

[2] Laurie Piron, Id at 4. Before the 1990s, Piron notes:
Typical initiatives in Africa included: supporting a new telecommunication law in Ghana,; law revision, updating of case law reports and a review of commercial law reviews in Tanzania as part of a legal management upgrading project,; and seminars on the Treaty to Harmonize Commercial Law in Africa.
See also Rama Mani, Promoting Rule of Law in Post Conflict Societies in Common Security and Civil Society in Africa, 145-162 (Samantha Gibson et al, eds., 1999). The author mentions legal training, redrafting constitutions, passing and enacting legislation, promoting commercial law, funding civic education, rebuilding court houses and promoting human rights as some of the rule of law activities funded by the international community in transitional countries in Africa. One area she views as having been ignored by rule of law interveners for instance is administrative law yet it influences “ many aspects of daily lives of citizens and condition their attitudes to the rule of law. Yet often administrative laws are enacted by decree, rather than by open and public procedures, thus entrusting great power and authority to unelected administrative bureucrats.” Id., at 154
[3] Id at 5.

[4] See e.g Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracies at Home and Abroad (2003). Indeed, the empirical  result of the democratic deficit in Africa are quite telling according to Claude Ake:
With a few exceptions, the democratization has been shallow; typically, it takes the form of multiparty elections that are really more of a democratic process than a democratic outcome. Authoritarian state structures remain, accountability to the governed is weak, and the rule of law is sometimes nominal. More often than not, people are voting without choosing.
claude ake, democracy and DEVELOPMENT IN africa, 136 (1996).

[5] gordon barron, the world bank and rule of law reforms, 6 (2005, London School of Economics). Recent initiatives by groups such as the American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative, which is largely supported through USAID funding,  have focused on more context specific ROL programming. See e.g., Aba-Africa Program Methodology and Focus available at http://www.abanet.org/rol/africa/>.

[6] The distinction between behavioral and structural reform of the judiciary is made by Dam, supra note xxx at 229. Structural reforms implicate the constitutional location of the judiciary, which most rule of law reforms have failed to target. In contrast, behavioral reforms really focus on issues of judicial remuneration and capacity issues e.g. computers, judicial trainings etc. In the case of Kenya for instance, it has been argued that
“the Kenyan legal system is replete with legislative enactments whose overall effect is to fetter, clog, dilute, transgress, vitiate and defeat the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the individual guaranteed under the Bill of Rights and negative judicial independence.”
See e.g., Pheroze Nowrojee, “Why the constitution needs to be changed” in in search of freedom and prosperity (Kivutha Kibwana et al. Eds.) 386 at p. 389 1996).

[7] Carothers, supra note 18 at 210

[8] Herbert Chitepo, Introductory Report to the Third Committee: The Responsibility of the Judiciary and the Bar for the Protection of the Rights of the Individual in Society, in african conference on the rule of law: report of proceedings, 80 (1961, International Commission of Jurists).

[9] Carothers agrees with this perspective thus:
[S]ome research shows that compliance with law depends most heavily on the perceived fairness and legitimacy of laws, characteristics that are not established primarily by the courts, but by other means, such as the political process.”
Carothers, supra 18, at 209.

[10]  The World Bank’s Justice for the Poor (J4P) research program is one of the emerging exceptions. It is “[A] multi-country study that seeks to develop an empirically-based understanding of how the poor or excluded navigate through local justice systems, in order to inform and evaluate innovative efforts at local-level justice reform.” See e.g., Justice for the Poor Kenya Concept Note (June 2007) available online at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTJUSFORPOOR/0,,menuPK:3282947~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:3282787,00.html>.

[11] Judicial corruption in Africa is legend. According to surveys, bribery in Kenya is rampant in the judiciary, which is ranked sixth among the country’s 10 most corrupt institutions. See generally, Strengthening Judicial Reforms Performance Indicators: Public Perceptions of the Kenya Judiciary (Nairobi: ICJ Kenya, 2001).
[12] Berry S.., Debating the Land Question in Africa, 44:4 comp. studies in soc’y and hist., 638-668, 651 (2002).

[13] See e.g., Gugulethu Moyo, Corrupt Judges and Land Rights in Zimbabwe in global corruption report (Transparency International, 2007) available online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/intlawjustinst/Resources/gcr07_complete_final.pdf>.

[14] Art. 24 (1) Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania (1984) provides:
Subject to the provisions of the relevant laws of the land, every person is entitled to the right to own property and has the right to the protection of his property held in accordance with law (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-article 1 it shall be unlawful for a person to be deprived of property for the purposes of nationalisation or for any other purposes without the authority of law which makes provisions for fair and adequate compensation.

[15] See generally, Jacqueline Klopp and Prisca Kamungi, Violence and Elections: Will Kenya Collapse? world policy j., 10-18 (2007/2008).

[16] sam moyo, socio-economic dominance of ethnic and racial groups-the african expreience, 22 (2004, UNDP Research Paper).

[17] Kemei and 9 Others v Attorney General and Others High Court of Kenya Civil Suit No.238 of 1999 accessed from http://www.kenyalaw.org>. In dismissing applicants’ suit for recognition of their possessory rights to a land on the basis of historical connectedness to it, the court asserted:

If hunting and gathering in a territory were in themselves alone to give automatic legal proprietary rights to the grounds and soils we hunt and gather upon, then those who graze cattle nomadically in migratory shifts everywhere according to climatic changes would have claimed ownership of every inch of every soil on which they have grazed their cattle.
Compare with: Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community, Constitutional Court of South Africa, CCT 19/03, (2003) (where the South African Constitutional Court held that the rights of a particular community survived the annexation of the land by the British Crown and could be held against the current occupiers of their land).

[18] Presidential Commissions of Inquiries have been the preferred method, the results of which have been abysmal.

[19] Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 foreign affairs, 198 (1998).

[20] Both Kenya and Tanzania have been involved in comprehensive land reforms over the last decade. In both countries, emerging frameworks have sought to either individualize common property or establish corporate entities to hold the land on behalf of villages or communities.

[21] The central reform has been to privatize common property. Privatization in most of Africa has been criticised as crude asset stripping:
Bullies and plunderers-who could never flourish if the rules of the game were crystal clear and reliably enforced-cannot be expected to promote or enforce a system that will radically devalue the rude skills of acquisition and domination they have perfected in the state of nature.
See e.g., Holmes S., Lineages of the Rule of Law in democracy and the rule of law, 20-21(2003). See also Kofele Kale N., The International Law of Responsibility for Economic Crimes: Holding State Officials Individually Liable for Acts of Fraudulent Enrichment 9 ( Ashgate 2006).

[22] While such lands initially in the hands of white settlers, especially in East Africa, were purchased by governments at independence, ostensibly to be redistributed to the poor, they were immediately converted to personal estates of the emerging African elite. In Kenya, the former white highlands in the Rift Valley province, the epicentre of much conflict including the latest in January-March 2008, is reflective of the failure of the ROL to intervene sufficiently to secure equitable property relations in the country. See Chris McGreal, Who's to Blame?  It Depends Where You Begin the Story' the guardian ( february 7, 2008), retrieved at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print.html>: The author asserts:

The extended Kenyatta family (1st president) alone owns an estimated 500,000 acres (2,000 sq km). That represents a large chunk of the 28m acres (113,000 sq km) of arable land in Kenya. The remaining 80% of the country is mostly semi-arid and arid land. The Kenya Land Alliance says more than half the arable land in the country is in the hands of only 20% of the population. Two-thirds of the people own, on average, less than an acre per person. There are 13% who own no land at all.

See also, african peer review mechanism, country review report of the republic of kenya, 70 (2006), retrieved  online at http://www.aprmkenya.org/downloads/kenyareport.pdf>. See also, Carolyn Wafule, Courts doing badly on political cases, says ICJ, daily nation (November 20, 2008)  at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/492816/-/yvnrrxz/-/index.html>. (Article asserts that “fundamental rights in the country (Kenya) have been claimed on the streets when there was a Judiciary that could have asserted them on behalf of those that claim them”, hence loosing its relevance).

[23] Carothers, Supra note 48, at 200.
[24] Malawi’s Safety, Security and Access to Justice Programme is a five year initiative funded by British Government for $ 70 million while Kenya’s and Uganda’s Governance, Justice Law and Order Sector Reforms pulls together well over $ 100 million each from a number of bilateral donors, including USAID. See E.g., Department for International Development, Justice and Poverty Reduction: Safety, Security and Justice for All, (2000, London).

[25] See, Millennium Corporation available at http://www.mcc.gov/programs/africa/index.php>.

[26] Id. While most of MCC support foes towards water and health sector support, it is notable that some focus is being directed at rule of law initiatives, notably anti corruption. However, in n Benin, a recipient of $307 million MCC targets “Increasing access to land through more secure and useful land tenure”, a clear shift from traditional rule of law programming; In Madagascar, MCC funds will help the country attain: Secure Access to Property: Formalize the land tenure system (e.g., titling and surveying), modernizing the national land registry, and expanding services to rural citizens; In Mozambique, “upgrading land information systems and services, and helping beneficiaries meet immediate needs for registered land rights and better access to land for investment” will benefit from 39 million dollar support from MCC.